The 'Harvest' China Wants Is One India Cannot Afford
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Article summary
A prominent opinion piece in The Hindu argues that India must not allow diplomatic optics — the desire to project normalcy in ties with China — to override substantive boundary negotiations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The piece warns that China's preferred 'harvest' from the current diplomatic thaw is Indian acquiescence to territorial status quos that favour Beijing, particularly in areas where Chinese infrastructure and forward deployments have altered ground realities since 2020. The Galwan Valley clash of June 2020 fundamentally reset India-China relations, leading to disengagement talks across multiple friction points including Depsang Plains and Demchok. While partial disengagement has occurred, critics argue that patrolling rights have not been fully restored and that normalisation of diplomatic ties risks cementing Chinese gains. For India, the stakes extend beyond bilateral optics — they touch upon sovereignty, strategic depth in Ladakh, and the credibility of its deterrence posture. UPSC aspirants must understand how boundary disputes intersect with diplomatic signalling, domestic political pressures, and long-term national security calculus.
What this tests
Sample questions — answers revealed after test
Q1. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China is divided into three sectors. Which of the following correctly identifies all three sectors?
Q2. India and China signed agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC in 1993, 1996, and 2005. A diplomat argues that these agreements 'resolved the boundary question in principle, leaving only technical demarcation pending.' Which of the following most precisely refutes this argument?
Q3. Consider the following statements regarding India's strategic and diplomatic position along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the post-2020 context: 1. The Depsang Plains are strategically significant primarily because Chinese blocking of patrol points Y1–Y7 denies India access to areas it has historically patrolled, making any settlement that does not restore these rights a de facto territorial concession. 2. China's construction of villages, roads, and helipads in buffer zones along the LAC constitutes a 'salami-slicing' strategy that is effectively countered once India achieves disengagement at friction points. 3. India's post-2020 measures — including restrictions on Chinese FDI, app bans, and suspension of direct flights — were primarily economic in motivation, aimed at reducing India's trade deficit with China. 4. Diplomatic normalisation with China that ignores patrolling rights and territorial encroachments risks converting temporary military gains into permanent geopolitical losses for India. Which of the statements given above are correct?