The Anti-Defection Law Under Strain: Why Legislator Defections Keep Testing the Tenth Schedule
Summary
A political controversy in West Bengal — with a Trinamool Congress MP alleging that a wave of resignations and defections to the BJP presents a 'dirty picture' of the state's political culture — is, beneath the rhetoric, a live illustration of the strains on India's anti-defection law.
●That law, contained in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution and inserted by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, disqualifies a legislator who voluntarily gives up party membership or votes against the party whip, while exempting a 'merger' of two-thirds of a party's legislators.
●The original 'split' exception was removed by the 91st Amendment Act, 2003, which also barred disqualified defectors from holding ministerial office and capped the council of ministers at 15% of the legislature.
●Yet defections persist through workarounds — most notably timed resignations that trigger by-elections, allowing legislators to switch sides without technically being 'disqualified'. The role of the Speaker as the sole adjudicator, and the delays that role produces, have drawn repeated Supreme Court criticism, from Kihoto Hollohan (1992) to Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020). For UPSC aspirants, the row is a ready-made case study of the Tenth Schedule's design, loopholes and reform debate.
The Tenth Schedule was added by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985.
●It lays down TWO grounds of disqualification for defection: (1) if a member of a House VOLUNTARILY GIVES UP membership of the party on whose ticket they were elected, and (2) if a member VOTES or ABSTAINS contrary to the party whip's direction (unless condoned within 15 days). For nominated members, defection is defined as joining any party after six months.
●The key EXCEPTION today is MERGER — no disqualification if two-thirds of the legislature party agree to merge with another party.
●The original one-third 'SPLIT' exception was DELETED by the 91st Amendment Act, 2003, which also (a) barred a disqualified defector from holding any remunerative political post/ministership until re-elected, and (b) capped the size of the Council of Ministers at 15% of the House (minimum 12 in states). The presiding officer (Speaker/Chairman) decides disqualification questions, and their decision is subject to judicial review — as held in Kihoto Hollohan v.
●Zachillhu (1992).
The single most testable fact: the anti-defection law is in the TENTH SCHEDULE (added by the 52nd Amendment, 1985); the one-third 'split' exception was abolished by the 91st Amendment (2003), leaving only the two-thirds 'merger' exception.
◎ In Simple Words
In India, if someone is elected as a member of a political party and then jumps to another party, there is a special rule that can throw them out of their seat — this is the anti-defection law. It was made in 1985 to stop the old habit of politicians switching sides for power or money. But clever politicians have found ways around it: for example, if two-thirds of a party's members join another party together, it counts as a legal 'merger', and sometimes members simply resign their seat and re-contest under a new party. In West Bengal, one party is accusing another of using such tactics to grow its strength. The bigger question is whether the law needs fixing so it actually stops defections.
Factual Pointers
Practice · 2 questions
With reference to the anti-defection law in India, consider the following statements:
1. The Tenth Schedule was added to the Constitution by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985.
2. The 91st Amendment Act, 2003 removed the exception that protected a 'split' of one-third of a legislature party.
3. A decision of the Speaker on a question of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is final and not subject to judicial review.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Under the Tenth Schedule, a defection does NOT attract disqualification in which one of the following situations?
Parliament & Legislature
This sub-topic has appeared in 16 UPSC Prelims questions.